Revealing the Depths of Directed Energy Weapons and Next Generation Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)

In
the
late
1930s,
a
palpable
sense
of
anxiety
gripped
the
state
security
corridors
of
both
Britain
and
America.
Whispers
circulated
about
a
formidable
Nazi
radio
beam
purportedly
capable
of
incinerating
vehicle
ignition
systems

Diligent
scrutiny
by
British
scientists
ensued,
leading
to
the
unequivocal
dismissal
of
this
notion.
The
technology
of
the
1930s
rendered
such
a
concept
implausible,
given
the
modest
power
of
radio
transmitters
and
the
sturdy
yet
rudimentary
vehicle
electronics
prevalent
during
that
era.

This
narrative
underwent
a
transformative
shift
with
the
emergence
of
the
atomic
bomb
and
subsequent
nuclear
testing.
The
detonation
of
this
nuclear
capability
set
off
a
formidable
cascade
of
gamma-ray
photons,
initiating
the
expulsion
of
electrons
from
air
molecules
through
a
process
known
as
Compton
scattering.
This
gave
rise
to
the
notion
of
electromagnetic
pulse
(EMP),
a
seismic
surge
of
radio
waves
distinguished
by
its
breathtakingly
instant
rise
time
and
far-reaching
impact.
According
to
Britannica,
EMP
was
first
noticed
in
the United
States in
the
1950s
when
electronic
equipment
failed
because
of
induced
currents
and
voltages
during
some
nuclear
tests.
In
1960
the
potential
vulnerability
of
U.S.
military
equipment
and
weapons
systems
to
EMP
was
officially
recognized.


https://www.britannica.com/science/nuclear-electromagnetic-pulse

In
the
aftermath
of
a
nuclear
conflagration
within
Earth’s
confines,
the
EMP
energy
primarily
resides
in
the
very
high
frequency
(VHF)
and
ultra-high
frequency
(UHF)
domains.
Nevertheless,
even
at
lower
frequencies,
a
resplendent
radio
flash
manifests
itself,
observable
across
vast
distances.
In
the
immediate
proximity
of
the
blast,
the
radio
frequency
energy
wields
the
power
to
induce
currents
of
sufficient
potency
to
wreak
havoc
on
most
unprotected
electronic
devices.
The
aftermath
of
a
blast
beyond
Earth’s
protective
cocoon
is
postulated
to
be
even
more
cataclysmic,
with
the
potential
to
inflict
electronic
devastation
across
expansive
territories.
A
one-megaton
explosion
hovering
250
miles
above
the
North
Sea
could
potentially
incapacitate
electronic
infrastructure
across
Northern
Europe.
As
a
result,
meticulous
shielding
and
Faraday
practices
become
the
vanguard
to
fortify
critical
military
systems
against
this
purported
capability.

The
peak
of
Western
consternation
regarding
EMP
arrived
when
the
Soviet
Union
delved
into
non-nuclear
EMP
weapons
during
the
mid-80s.
This
era
witnessed
the
United
States
deploying
“neutron
bombs,”
and
the
Soviets,
in
response,
brandishing
the
spectre
of
a
“socialist
bomb.”
This
ideological
weapon
was
crafted
to
decimate
property,
particularly
electronics

while
sparing
human
life

loomed
large
on
the
geopolitical
chessboard.

The
transition
from
the
era
of
valves
to
transistors
and
integrated
circuits,
culminating
at
the
end
of
World
War
II,
ushered
in
a
period
of
heightened
susceptibility
for
commercial
electronic
apparatuses
to
the
onslaught
of
high-powered
radars.
The
advent
of
the
cavity
magnetron
gave
rise
to
radars
potent
enough
to
dismantle
unprotected
electronic
circuitry
within
the
close
confines
of
several
hundred
yards.
As
technology
continued
its
progressive
miniaturization,
the
Soviets
purportedly
fashioned
high-energy
RF
(HERF)
devices,
concocted
from
capacitors,
magnetohydrodynamic
generators,
and
kindred
components,
for
deployment
on
the
battlefield.

In
the
mid-1990s,
an
ominous
cloud
of
apprehension
enveloped
the
global
landscape,
as
concerns
mounted
that
terrorists
might
lay
their
hands
on
these
formidable
capabilities,
courtesy
of
the
now-defunct
Soviet
Union.
Endeavours
to
implore
commerce
and
industry
to
invest
in
electromagnetic
shielding
encountered
scepticism
and
were
often
summarily
dismissed
as
hyperbole.
The
specifics
of
Soviet
HERF
bombs
remained
ensconced
in
classified
vaults,
yet
the
tenets
of
physics
hinted
at
constraints
tied
to
the
effective
antenna
size,
shaping
the
boundaries
of
EMP
effects,
intimating
that
the
efficacy
of
EMP
is
circumscribed
by
the
dielectric
strength
of
air
and
the
cross-section
of
the
antenna.
While
nuclear
EMP
flaunts
an
effective
antenna
size
spanning
hundreds
of
meters
to
several
thousand
kilometres,
the
“ordinary”
EMP/HERF
is
constrained
to
a
more
modest
antenna
size
of
a
few
meters.
NATO
strategists,
nevertheless,
stood
firm
in
their
assertion
that
military
command
and
control
(C2)
systems
already
fortified
against
nuclear
EMP
should
stand
resolute
against
the
looming
spectre
of
EMP
threats.

Amid
the
looming
spectre
of
potential
threats,
scepticism
persists
regarding
the
potency
of
EMP
weapons,
especially
when
compared
against
more
conventional
modes
of
wreaking
havoc.
The
disquieting
notion
lingers
that
a
solitary
nuclear
detonation
strategically
positioned
250
miles
above
the
heartland
of
the
United
States
could
unleash
economic
havoc
of
colossal
proportions
while
inflicting
minimal
direct
harm
to
individuals.
This
ominous
prospect
raises
the
spectre
of
a
potent
blackmail
tool
wielded
by
nations
such
as
Iran
and
North
Korea,
harbouring
nuclear
aspirations
but
endowed
with
less
sophisticated
infrastructures.

In
the
theatre
of
information
warfare,
a
poignant
observation
surfaces

a
massive
assault
on
electronic
communications
poses
a
graver
peril
to
technologically
reliant
nations,
exemplified
by
the
United
States,
in
comparison
to
nations
like
North
Korea
or
China,
which
exhibit
lesser
dependence
on
such
systems.
The
intricate
interplay
among
Directed
Energy
Weapons
(DEW),
EMP,
and
the
potential
for
economic
turmoil
underscores
the
multi-dimensional
challenges
inherent
in
shielding
modern
societies
against
the
ceaseless
evolution
of
threats.

In
the
ongoing
conflict
between
Russia
and
Ukraine,
a
mysterious
world
unfolds
as
Electronic
Warfare
(EW)
takes
centre
stage.
Imagine
a
scenario
where
high-tech
systems
clash,
and
strategies
unfold
like
a
complex
dance

this
is
the
electronic
battleground,
where
the
recent
discovery
of
the
powerful
Krasukha-4
system
has
added
intrigue
to
an
already
intense
situation.

At
first,
the
Krasukha-4
seemed
too
mighty
for
Russia’s
initial
assault
on
Kyiv,
but
now
it’s
making
a
strategic
comeback.
EW
brigades,
taking
advantage
of
Russia’s
control
in
the
Donbas
region,
are
using
the
Krasukha-4
to
target
Ukrainian
drones
and
disrupt
their
communication
links.
This
clever
interference
throws
a
spanner
in
the
works
for
Ukrainian
forces,
making
it
harder
for
them
to
pinpoint
Russian
artillery
positions.

To
add
some
context,
the
Russian
army
got
creative
before
the
invasion,
breaking
down
its
larger
manoeuvre
brigades
into
smaller
Battalion
Tactical
Groups
(BTGs).
Each
BTG,
now
operating
in
southern
and
eastern
Ukraine,
has
a
slice
of
the
original
brigade’s
EW
company,
using
shorter-range
electronic
attack
systems.

Ukraine
isn’t
just
sitting
back.
Thanks
to
counter-drone
systems
from
the
United
States,
Ukrainian
troops
have
taken
down
hundreds
of
Russian
drones
by
muddling
GPS
signals.
They’ve
also
been
using
U.S.
supplied
EW
systems
and
training
to
disrupt
Russian
communications.

So,
what
is
the
key
to
Ukraine’s
success
so
far?
The
big
and
powerful
Russian
EW
systems,
like
the
Leer-3
or
Krasukha-4,
are
easy
to
find.
Ukrainian
troops,
armed
with
U.S.
supplied
gear,
have
been
able
to
detect
signals
from
these
systems
and
launch
counterattacks
against
them.

But
there
is
a
catch.
In
this
electronic
cat-and-mouse
game,
Russia
is
gaining
an
upper
hand

Why?
Because
their
initial
plan
of
swiftly
taking
Kyiv
didn’t
work
out,
they
shifted
gears
to
a
slow
and
steady
war
in
Ukraine’s
south.
Now,
with
a
more
defined
battlefront,
Russian
EW
units
can
jam
Ukrainian
hardware
when
they’re
separated
by
clear
lines.

Winning
the
airwaves
doesn’t
mean
winning
the
war.
Russia
might
be
on
top
in
the
EW
game
for
now,
but
the
situation
could
flip
if
Kyiv’s
troops,
with
some
help
from
their
allies
in
the
West,
regain
control
of
the
skies.
Imagine
disrupting
the
very
systems
that
keep
Russia’s
war
machine
rolling

it
could
change
the
whole
game.


Too
Late?
The
move
to
counter
Russia
and
China

The
late
General
Douglas
MacArthur
said,
The
history
of
failure
in
war
can
almost
always
be
summed
up
in
two
words:
‘Too
late.’
Too
late
in
comprehending
the
deadly
purpose
of
a
potential
enemy.
Too
late
in
realizing
the
mortal
danger.
Too
late
in
preparedness.
Too
late
in
uniting
all
possible
forces
for
resistance.”


https://www.forbes.com/sites/eliamdur/2021/03/11/too-late/

Quoted
in
July
2023,
the
Secretary
of
the
United
States
Air
Force
(USAF),
Frank
Kendall,
stated

“Over
the
last
two
years
in
my
position
as
secretary
of
the
Air
Force,
I
have
begun
each
of
my
eight
Congressional
budget
posture
hearings
with
a
reference
to
Gen.
Douglas
MacArthur’s
warning
that
almost
all
military
failures
can
be
summed
up
in
the
words
“too
late”.”


https://breakingdefense.com/2023/06/kendall-more-rapid-acquisition-is-within-reach-if-congress-acts/

Gen.
MacArthur,
of
course,
spoke
from
a
position
of
being
a
Military
leader
well
within
range
of
ongoing
enemy
attacks.
That
perspective
is
too
often
absent
in
debates
over
weapons
system
development,
which
tend
to
be
Washington-centric
and
politicized
among
Congressional,
Pentagon,
and
industry
participants.

Mr.
Kendall
led
United
States
Forces
Japan,
Gen.
MacArthur’s
legacy
headquarters
and
command,
where
the
constant
focus
was
being
ready
to
respond
to
Chinese
threats.
His
focus
was
China’s
military
build-up
and
on
North
Korea’s
provocative
activities.

He
candidly
spoke
of
congressional
and
defense
industry
leadership
occasionally
visiting
pacific
command
headquarters
at
Yokota
Air
Base,
West
of
Tokyo,
in
the
2002-2005
timeframe,
but
was
dismayed
that
they
rarely
listened.
Consequently,
there
was
little
to
no
ability
to
influence
joint
warfighting
requirements,
including
the
need
for
timely,
responsive
upgrades
to
the
offensive
capabilities
of
NATO
combat
air
forces,
to
air
base
defense,
C2
systems,
satellite
early
warning,
or
targeting
of
Chinese
and
North
Korean
surface-to-surface
launch
capabilities.
Most
troubling
was
that
they
were
never
asked
about
the
integration
of
EW.
Like
all
joint
warfighting
commands,
U.S.
Forces
Command
in
Japan
had
zero
contractual
authority
for
weapons
systems
and
no
acquisition
budget.

During
that
period
and
the
decades
that
followed,
America’s
national
security
leadership
was
actively
engaged
in
another
fight:
trying
to
deter
threats
and
promote
stable,
friendly
governments
in
the
Middle
East.
With
attention
focused
elsewhere,
the
Chinese
Communist
Party
was
able
to
leverage
economic
growth
and
insights
gained
watching
the
U.S.
military
at
work
to
accelerate
its
own
military
build-up.
Kendal
last
year
reported
that
the
United
States
can
no
longer
guarantee
that
America’s
joint
war
fighters
will
be
effective
in
combat
operations
across
U.S.
Indo-Pacific
Command’s
area
of
operations,
including
protecting
allies
and
partners
in
Taiwan,
Japan,
and
South
Korea.

While
Congressional
and
Pentagon
leaders
emphasize
support
for
American
war
fighters,
the
fact
is
that
unified
combatant
commands
and
sub-unified
commands
like
United
States
Forces
Japan
are
today
significantly
limited
in
their
ability
and
authority
to
influence
joint
warfighting
requirements
with
their
own
threat-informed
analysis.

The
Joint
Requirements
Oversight
Council
(JROC),
led
by
the
Vice
Chairman
of
the
Joint
Chiefs
of
Staff,
Navy
Adm.
Christopher
W.
Grady,
is
dedicated
to
being
the
voice
of
the
joint
warfighter,
but
this
organizational
construct
is
neither
optimized
for
speed
nor
efficiency.
Our
long-established
Congressional,
military,
and
defense
industry
cultures
put
too
many
cooks
in
the
kitchen.
Acquisition
staff
too
frequently
lack
combat
and
operational
theatre
experience,
and
too
often
default
to
‘NO’
when
they
should
instead
try
to
understand
new
ideas.

USAF
Secretary
Kendall
has
brought
a
lifetime
of
experience,
as
a
Soldier
and
as
a
policy
maker,
to
the
USAF.
His
decades
of
experience,
keen
insight,
and
driven
focus
on
operational
effectiveness
are
making
a
real
difference.
By
focusing
strategically
around
seven
core
‘Operational
Imperatives’
and
three
‘Cross-cutting
Operational
Enablers’,
Kendall
has
rallied
his
Air
and
Space
Forces
leaders
around
the
key
requirements
that
will
transform
his
department’s
operational
effectiveness.
Mr.
Kendall
knows
the
most
important
customers
for
new
capabilities
are
our
military
operators,
including
the
Service
Chiefs
whose
long
experience
in
operational
theatres
informs
their
understanding.
Forging
close
partnerships
between
operational
customers
and
acquisition
professionals
is
crucial.
It’s
no
accident
that
he
called
these
imperatives,
which
are
all
focused
on
acquiring
new
capabilities,
“operational.”
From
the
moment
he
took
office,
Kendall
has
repeatedly
called
for
accelerating
the
delivery
of
“meaningful
operational
capability
to
the
warfighter.”

When
the
Korean
War
began,
communists
in
the
North
and
their
Russian
and
Chinese
backers
took
advantage
of
American
weakness

a
small
trip-wire
force
in
South
Korea,
in
particular

to
force
a
war
America
never
wanted.
In
Vietnam,
a
decade
later,
the
United
States
was
again
drawn
into
a
conflict
for
which
we
were
unprepared.
Having
built
a
force
to
deter
nuclear
war,
America
was
unprepared
for
the
kind
of
fight
Hanoi
waged
against
our
allies
in
the
south.
By
the
time
we
had
the
military
capabilities
to
be
decisive,
the
nation
had
lost
its
will
to
fight.
As
Gen.
McArthur
said,
“Too
late.”

Now
we
face
new
dangers.
The
instigators
are
familiar,
even
if
the
means,
methods,
and
conditions
are
less
so.
We
must
listen
to
the
commanders
in
the
field.
No
one
understands
the
threat
better.

After
Pearl
Harbour,
Japanese
Adm.
Isoroku
Yamamoto
was
famously
said
to
have
feared
that
all
Japan
had
achieved
with
the
surprise
attack
on
Pearl
Harbour
was
to
“awaken
a
sleeping
giant
and
fill
him
with
a
terrible
resolve.”
Alas,
that
giant
showed
its
resolve
and
shook
the
World

Yet
since
the
fall
of
the
Berlin
wall,
has
been
lying
in
its
bed
with
eyes
wide
open,
but
tucked
in
so
tightly
with
a
blanket
of
bureaucracy
and
indecision
that
it
simply
can’t
move.
Pentagon
leaders,
Senate
and
House
committee
members,
and
the
defense
industry
all
must
pay
heed.
They
must
do
so
before
it
once
again
is
“too
late.”


New
U.S.
Initiatives

After
six
years
of
committed
effort,
the
Pentagon’s
innovation
initiatives
still
fall
short
of
their
objectives.
Despite
some
notable
successes,
the
Department
of
Defense
is
missing
a
crucial
opportunity
to
fulfil
its
promise
of
providing
transformative
technologies
to
the
U.S.
Military.
In
recent
years,
various
Defense
Department
offices
and
initiatives
have
emerged
to
engage
with
the
commercial
high-tech
marketplace,
including
the
Defense
Innovation
Unit
(DIU),
the
National
Security
Innovation
Network
(NSIN),
SOFWERX,
AFWERX,
NavalX,
and
more.

Simultaneously,
the
defense
science
board
continues
its
close
collaboration
with
the
academic
community.
However,
these
two
communities,
while
sharing
similarities,
operate
in
parallel
silos
with
distinct
challenges
and
limitations.
Breaking
down
these
silos
reveals
that
each
contains
the
means
to
address
the
shortcomings
of
the
other.
Researchers
can
assist
venture
capitalists
and
start-ups
in
accessing
cutting-edge
science,
while
commercial
innovators
and
Pentagon
organizations
designed
to
facilitate
start-up-government
transactions
can
expedite
the
transition
of
early-stage
research
into
viable
products.
This
collaborative
approach
aims
for
a
swift
acceleration
in
developing
military
capabilities,
benefiting
both
the
Warfighter,
the
Taxpayer,
and
the
Consumer.

The
Pentagon’s
increased
reliance
on
the
private
sector
for
defense-relevant
technologies
is
not
a
recent
development.
Initiatives
like
In-Q-Tel,
established
by
the
Central
Intelligence
Agency
(CIA)
in
1999,
and
the
Army
Venture
Capital
Corporation
(AVCC)
in
2002,
have
paved
the
way
for
engaging
with
innovative
start-ups.
However,
the
evolving
landscape
has
led
to
the
adoption
of
alternative
models,
such
as
the
Defense
Venture
Catalyst
Initiative
(DeVinCI)
and
the
Defense
Innovation
Unit
Experimental
(DIUX).
Contrary
to
earlier
approaches,
recent
Pentagon
efforts
include
contracting
methods,
allowing
prospective
government
customers
to
access
pitched
technologies.
Recognizing
the
limitations
of
‘tech
tourism’,
officials
are
moving
innovation
from
the
periphery
of
formal
acquisition
processes
to
the
center,
integrating
edge-acquisition
expertise
into
mainstream
practices.

The
less
glamorous
side
of
innovation
involves
creating
contracting
pathways
for
start-ups

behind-the-scenes
work,
including
drafting
contracts
in
advance,
is
crucial
for
achieving
rapid,
agile,
and
innovative
outcomes.
In
the
pursuit
of
innovation,
the
Department
of
Defense
(DoD)
is
increasingly
recognizing
the
role
of
scientific
research.
Like
pitch
competitions
in
the
commercial
sector,
research
symposia
serve
as
forums
for
vetting
new
ideas
within
a
community
of
experts.
The
collaboration
between
the
research
community
and
the
high-tech
market
presents
an
opportunity
to
accelerate
the
development
of
scalable
capabilities
for
both
military
and
commercial
applications.
The
DoD’s
recent
experiences
emphasize
several
key
lessons:


  • First,
    awareness
    of
    advanced
    technology
    must
    be
    coupled
    with
    access
    to
    be
    effective.

  • Second,
    the
    focus
    should
    shift
    from
    innovating
    at
    the
    edge
    to
    implementing
    recent
    changes
    into
    major
    defense
    acquisition
    programs.

  • Third,
    the
    unglamorous
    work
    of
    navigating
    bureaucratic
    processes
    is
    essential
    for
    successful
    innovation.

Lastly,
engaging
the
research
community
alongside
venture
capitalists
and
start-ups
can
optimize
the
application
of
cutting-edge
science
and
accelerate
the
development
timeline
from
discovery
to
product
development,
expediting
the
development
of
scalable
capabilities
for
both
military
and
commercial
purposes.


What
Comes
Next?

Known
to
many,
my
commitment
centers
on
addressing
tangible
needs
and
achieving
feats
once
deemed
unattainable
due
to
technology
availability,
outside
of
Artemis
Defense
Technologies,
I
have
been
supporting
a
stealth
venture
that
today
stands
at
the
threshold
of
engaging
with
the
defense
investment
fraternity.
This
venture
specializes
in
providing
EW
capabilities,
featuring
a
revolutionary
technology
capable
of
emulating
the
debilitating
effects
of
EMP
impact
in
a
small
form
factor
and
precise
area
and
beamform.
This
capability
has
undergone
scrutiny
and
received
funding
and
validation
from
a
government
scientific
defense
organization,
elevating
its
Technology
Readiness
Level
(TRL).

In
addition
to
this
capability,
the
venture
has
produced
the
required
early
software
development
that
enables
uncrewed
navigation
capabilities
that
require
swarmed
uncrewed
assets
to
stay
on
task
to
near
centimetre
accuracy
in
electronic
congestion
situations
that
impact
real
time
kinematic
(RTK)
and
Global
Navigation
Satellite
Systems
(GNSS).

The
significance
of
novel
EW
capabilities
cannot
be
overstated,
as
they
hold
the
potential
to
reshape
the
landscape
of
defense
technology
and
significantly
enhance
the
operational
capabilities
of
the
U.S.
Military
across
Air,
Land,
and
Sea
domains.

National
security
imperatives
demand
a
swift
transition
from
ground-breaking
research
to
operational
deployment.
The
true
strategic
importance
of
our
technology
lies
not
only
in
its
innovation
and
our
focus
to
enable
this
with
commercial
off-the-shelf
(COTS)
parts,
but
also
in
its
potential
to
provide
a
decisive
edge
on
the
ever-growing
threats
to
our
cities
and
on
the
battlefield.

The
synergy
between
the
research
community,
venture
capitalists,
and
defense
organizations
is
pivotal
in
accelerating
the
development
timeline
from
discovery
to
operational
deployment.

The
call
for
funding
is
not
just
a
call
for
this
venture
but
a
call
for
those
who
wish
to
assist
in
delivering
technological
superiority
on
the
global
stage.
Never
again
should
we
be
forced
to
utter
“Too
late”.

The
time
to
act
is
now.

Carl
Cagliarini